On 2023年11月6日, we filed two amicus briefs together with the MacArther Justice Center 和 the Fred T. 是松法律和平等中心, 在科罗拉多州最高法院审理的两起陪审团选择案件中, 人v. 约翰逊和人民. 奥斯丁. These cases are part of our Systemic Equality 和 Smart Justice projects. Our amicus briefs argued that prosecutors cannot exclude people of color from juries based on their experiences of racial injustice with police. Mislabeling these experiences as race-neutral reasons for removal leads to unchecked racial discrimination in jury selection, 破坏法律体系的完整性.
科罗拉多州的陪审团审判中, each side can remove a certain number of potential jurors from the panel without the need for any reason or explanation, 只要理由不违宪就行. 这些清除行动被称为“先发制人的打击”.在巴特森诉. 肯塔基州，美国.S. Supreme 法院 held that intentional racial discrimination in jury selection is unconstitutional, 和 prosecutors may not use their preemptory strikes to strike potential jurors because of their race. 但在科罗拉多州最高法院的两起案件中, the government argued that prosecutors weren’t striking jurors “because of their race” when they used preemptory strikes on jurors who talked about their experience with police officers’ racial bias.
在《利记sbobet》杂志上. 约翰逊, a prosecutor used a preemptory strike on the only Black juror on the panel, 引用陪审员的问卷, 她在哪里写了她和警察的不愉快经历, 谁因为某些种族身份而不尊重.”
在《利记sbobet》杂志上. 奥斯丁, a non-white juror indicated that she had been racially profiled by police 和 that she had been part of a group seeking to change a racially biased Denver Police Department ticketing practice. The prosecutor sought to use a preemptory strike on her because of her involvement in the reforms of the Denver Police Department.
这两种情况, the trial court found that the reasons articulated by the prosecution for the strikes were race neutral. The 法院 of Appeals reversed the trial court in each case, finding 巴特森 violations.
在约翰逊, the 法院 of Appeals concluded that “a Black juror’s personal experience with law enforcement that is race based, 不是, 从表面上看, 一个种族中立的解释.” Therefore, it was unconstitutional to strike the juror because the strike was based on race. The 法院 of Appeals also concluded that the race-based reason the prosecutor articulated tainted the other reason provided, 因此巴特森的挑战本应持续下去. 在奥斯汀, 上诉法院在约翰逊案中也做出了同样的判决, concluding the prosecutor’s strike based on the juror’s personal experience 和 involvement in racial justice activism was not race-neutral reasons, 巴特森的挑战本应持续下去.
The government seeks rulings that would allow them to strike jurors of color based on nothing more than their personal experiences with racially-biased policing.
Our brief argued that jurors of color’s personal racialized experiences with police 和 their participation in racial justice efforts are not grounds to exclude them from juries. To hold otherwise is to invite racial discrimination into the jury selection process. Our brief discussed pervasive police discrimination against people of color in Colorado, the deep connections between lived experience 和 racial justice activism, 和 the harm racial discrimination in jury selection does to the legal system. We urged the court to exercise its authority under the Colorado Constitution to prevent prosecutors from striking jurors of color because of their lived experience of racial injustice, 和 to hold that any racial discrimination in the exercise of a preemptory strike renders it unconstitutional.
On June 3, 2024, the Colorado Supreme 法院 issued its decisions in 约翰逊 和 奥斯丁, holding that a lawyer can strike a juror because of the juror's experience of racial injustice at the h和s of police. The 法院 reasoned that because distrust of law enforcement 不是 "an inherent characteristic of any race," when a lawyer strikes a juror of color for their personal experience of police racism, 他们不是因为他们的种族才打他们的. The 法院 also concluded that where a prosecutor attempts to strike a juror of color 和 gives a race-based reason for the strike 和 a racially neutral reason, as long as the strike was not "substantially motivated" by the race-based reason, 这不是一次歧视性的罢工. 这一判决允许种族主义进入我们挑选陪审团的过程, 前提是这不是“大量”的种族主义. We do not accept the idea that any racism in jury selection is constitutional or just.
我们对裁决感到失望. 提供的框架 巴特森v. Kentucky has, by every measure, failed to root out racial bias in jury selection. State courts can 和 should fashion their own procedures to combat this widespread 和 incredibly harmful problem. The Colorado Supreme 法院 missed an important opportunity to do so here. Justice Márquez, joined by Justices Hart 和 Samour, wrote a concurrence about how ineffective the 巴特森 框架一直在遏制种族主义的陪审团选择, 以及先发制人的罢工中固有的种族偏见的危险. 这一一致意见表明，政府应该进行大量改革 巴特森 框架, 包括, 但不限于, substantial reforms that can combat racial discrimination in jury selection. We encourage the 法院 to institute the proposed changes to Rule 24 和 pursue all other avenues available to it to combat the racial discrimination occurring in jury selection proceedings across Colorado.
